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1. INTRODUCTION
Rudanko makes a case for recognizing a new kind of fallacy which he calls ad
urgentiam. In his words, “ad urgentiam concerns using questionable tactics to
railroad an audience into agreeing to an initiative without having a chance properly
to debate the measure and to expose any problems with the measure in the course
of debate.” Rudanko’s example of an ad urgentiam argument is an excellent one.
Senator Overman’s argument was part of a well-documented debate, and its context
can be well-understood. Moreover, the way in which Senator Overman presents his
case for expediting the debate (and passage) of the Sedition Act of 1918 leaves little
doubt that Overman is disingenuous in the reasons he gives.
Though Rudanko locates the ad urgentiam fallacy in political discourse, I
think we can also recognize this argument type in other areas of discourse.
Legislatures are not the only forums in which people have much to gain from
creating an artificial sense of haste in their audience. Consider a classic sales ploy
that you might hear on a TV infomercial:
If you call to order the Kitchen Logician in the next 30 minutes, we’ll throw in this
fabulous set of steak knives—a $25 value! Act now! Operators are waiting!

Rudanko identifies ad urgentiam as a companion piece to the ad socordiam
argument, which is another purported fallacy. An ad socordiam argument is one in
which the arguer urges the postponement of a debate or decision and evidently does
so because he wishes to avoid the possibility of the debate or decision going the
wrong way. These argument types are so similar in form—one involves the use of
questionable tactics to hasten a vote or decision and the other to postpone a vote or
decision—that I think that Rudanko is right to suggest that ad urgentiam and ad
socordiam stand or fall together, but I will limit my comments here to ad urgentiam.
In the remainder of this commentary, I consider two potential roadblocks to
Rudanko’s analysis and to his case for recognizing ad urgentiam as a fallacy within
the tradition of informal logic.
2. CAN FALLACY ATTRIBUTIONS BE BASED ON INFERENCES ABOUT COVERT
INTENTIONS?
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
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Rudanko’s analysis of the ad urgentiam fallacy involves attributing covert intentions
to arguers. For Rudanko, a key question is the basis on which one might make
inferences about the intentions of speakers for the purposes of assessing
fallaciousness. (p. 4) The basis that Rudanko gives—the speaker’s track record, and
the wider context of the debate—strikes me as fully adequate for this purpose. But
I’d like to take a step back from this question and raise the issue of whether
inferences about the speaker’s intentions have a place in the analysis of fallacies.
One impulse is to say that fallacy attributions should never rely on inferences
about speakers’ intentions, but this surely goes too far. It is often crucial to make
inferences about the speaker’s meaning in the attributing informal fallacies, and
inferences about the speaker’s intentions undoubtedly play a part in this. Moreover,
there is at least one instance of what I take to be a “fallacy in good standing” in
which a fallacy attribution always requires inferences about covert intentions—the
“veiled-threat” ad baculum. (Woods, 1995, pp. 248-250)
The veiled-threat ad baculum is one in which, perhaps for the sake of
deniability, the perpetrator of an ad baculum argument uses indirect terms to
present the threat on which the argument rests. For example, if a reputed mobster
walks into your place of business and says to you, “Although my trash hauling
company charges higher rates than the competition, I believe you’ll find it in your
best interests to sign on with my company,” you will probably be able to see that he
is not merely making a promise of excellent service. An inference about the
speaker’s intentions is undoubtedly crucial to recognizing that this is an ad baculum
argument and a fallacy.
Most ad baculum arguments, as John Woods argues, are not fallacious; they
can function as fully cogent prudential arguments “when compliance with their
conclusions is the best cost-benefit or risk aversion outcome.” (Woods, 1995, p. 250)
But Woods also argues convincingly that a veiled-threat ad baculum argument can
be fallacious if it has the effect of misrepresenting prudential reasons as alethic
reasons. The mobster’s argument, for example can be fallacious if it leads the
business owner to believe that signing on with the mobster’s trash hauling company
is not only the most prudent course of action but also a way to achieve good value
for the money (perhaps because he doesn’t want to think of himself as being
vulnerable to intimidation). Though it is only a “sometimes” fallacy, the veiledthreat ad baculum is an instance in which a fallacy attribution depends upon making
inferences about hidden intentions.
Still, a reliance on using speakers’ intentions in identifying fallacies poses a
problem for the Rudanko’s analysis of ad urgentiam arguments. As Jansen points out
in a commentary on an earlier paper by Rudanko, one consequence of using
speakers’ intentions in identifying fallacies is that “the same utterance must be
judged fallacious when the intention is bad and sound when the intention is good.”
(Jansen, 2009, p. 2) This consequence is hard to accept in the case of ad urgentiam.
Imagine that a naïve junior senator was convinced by Senator Overman’s ad
urgentiam argument and makes the same argument to a colleague, but does so with
a sincere belief that the impending bond sale is sufficient reason for keeping the
debate short and with no covert intentions to push the Sedition Act through the
2
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Senate. There would be no basis to conclude that the junior senator’s reasons are
disingenuous, and so the argument is not deemed a fallacy when the junior senator
makes it but is a fallacy when Senator Overman does. But why should this be so?
The argument functions the same way in each case.
This problem seems inevitable under the “covert intentions” analysis of this
alleged fallacy, but perhaps it’s possible to find an alternative analysis that focuses
on the effect that the argument might have on its audience rather than the
intentions of the speaker.
3. WHERE DOES COGNITIVE ERROR FIT IN?
If we extend our comparison between the veiled-threat ad baculum and ad
urgentiam, we come upon an important difference. The veiled-threat ad baculum is
sometimes a fallacy, if you accept Woods’s analysis, because it can induce cognitive
error. The business owner who rationalizes that the mobster trash hauler will
provide better service makes one specific cognitive error. A politician who comes to
believe that a certain policy is ethically right because a veiled threat promises dire
political consequences if she doesn’t support that policy likewise makes a cognitive
error.
But a close look at ad urgentiam arguments shows us that, with respect to the
central issue of debate, the error that these arguments induce is metacognitive. As
Rudanko puts it: “The informal fallacy…consists in Overman attempting to deprive
the Senate of a reasonable opportunity to debate the bill….” (p. 6) The argument
then, is not an inducement to any particular cognitive error. Not taking enough time
to consider a serious and complex issue like this one would, however, be a mistake
in metacognition—a failure to bring about the proper conditions for your best
cognitive effort. While metacognitive error can eventually lead to cognitive errors,
it’s not itself a cognitive error.
Likewise when an infomercial offers an inducement for calling in the next 30
minutes, the goal is to get the customer to act while he’s still under the spell of the
sales pitch. This is an inducement for the metacognitive error of allowing yourself to
make a hasty decision. While this metacognitive error might increase the likelihood
of cognitive error in general, it doesn’t push the customer to any specific cognitive
error.
The question becomes that of whether there can be a fallacy that is not a
direct inducement to cognitive error. Can an argument be fallacious because it
induces error at the metacognitive level? My sense is that a direct inducement of
cognitive error is necessary, but I admit that the issue needs deeper investigation.
Though I’m not convinced that ad urgentiam should be recognized as a
fallacy, I don’t think this takes much away from its importance as an argument type.
Self-serving arguments aimed at convincing others to shorten debate or reach a
quick decision are too widespread not to merit our attention. Even if they are not
fallacies, they can still be denounced for the ethically questionable tactics they
exhibit and the suspect motivations they reveal. Moreover, this type of argument
does have a prominent place in political discourse, which Rudanko capably
investigates, and this adds to its importance. (In this regard, we could add that ad
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urgentiam arguments are often used in a justificatory role for invoking
parliamentary procedures that bring debate to an early end and for shuffling the
order of items on legislative agendas.) Fallacy or not, there is much to be gained
from the study of these arguments, and Rudanko’s paper is a welcome contribution.
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